AFRINIC governance: a members’ company run without its members
AFRINIC is a company, and a company is governed by its members, under its constitution and the law. On paper AFRINIC’s members elect its Board and can set its policies. In practice its register of members names eight directors and one company, its Board came out of a rerun whose result is still before the Supreme Court of Mauritius, it has been in receivership since 2023, and a draft constitution would take the members’ say over policy away. Here is how AFRINIC is governed, who governs it today, and what the governance of a registry should be.
How is AFRINIC governed?
On paper, AFRINIC is governed by its members, under its constitution and the law of Mauritius.
It is a private company: it describes itself as “a nonprofit, member-based organisation”, and a member-based company belongs to those members, not to its Board, its Receiver or any government. The members elect the Board, eight seats, to oversee the company that keeps their records, and Article 7.6(iv) of the constitution lets them set AFRINIC’s general policies by ordinary resolution. AFRINIC answers to the law like any other company.
Lu Heng’s Note 1
On AFRINIC, RIR Governance, and the Myth of “Community Ownership”
What does “community ownership” mean when a few insiders control the rules?
Who are AFRINIC’s members, and who is on its register?
AFRINIC’s members are the networks it serves.
They are its Resource Members, the networks whose number resources AFRINIC registers; its bylaws keep a second category, the Registered Member, for its directors. The Registrar of Companies’ record of AFRINIC, issued on 28 October 2026, lists eight directors and one company, Cloud Innovation. On our information, more than 2,000 resource members have been left off. A company whose owners are missing from its register is being governed without them.
Lu Heng’s Note 73
The Multi-Stakeholder Mirage – How the Multi-Stakeholder Model Turned Attendance Into Mandate
When did attendance start to count as a mandate?
How was AFRINIC’s Board chosen?
The present Board came out of a rerun, and whether it was validly appointed is still before the Court.
In June 2025 AFRINIC’s Receiver annulled the entire Board election over “one disputed proxy”, and his rules for the new one banned the proxy voting that Article 12.12 of AFRINIC’s constitution allows. In the disputed election of September 2025 the candidates of a single alliance of 40 governments won seven of the eight seats. In SC/COM/MOT/000757/2025, AFRINIC and its Receiver have asked the Supreme Court to declare those appointments valid, and we oppose that application. We do not recognise this Board as lawfully constituted.
Lu Heng’s Note 62
Mandate Laundering: From RIR Fantasy to Transition Architecture
When does an institution stop performing authority and start believing it possesses it?
Why is AFRINIC in receivership?
Because by September 2023 it could no longer govern itself.
AFRINIC had four directors, too few for a board quorum, and no chief executive. On our application the Supreme Court of Mauritius found the orders we sought “fully justified, reasonable, and fair” and placed AFRINIC in receivership, to preserve its assets and to see that elections are held under its constitution. A Receiver is an officer of the Court. The Receiver now in office, appointed by the Court on 12 February 2025, annulled an election over one vote, left a signed undertaking unkept and wrote to ministers, not to the Court.
Lu Heng’s Note 17
On the ICP-2 Revision, RIR Failure Standards, and Why Power Must Remain Bottom-Up
Who should decide when a registry has failed: its members, or the institutions above it?
What would AFRINIC’s proposed constitution change?
It would give the members less say and the directors more.
Today Article 7.6(iv) of the constitution lets the members set AFRINIC’s general policies by ordinary resolution, and Article 7.4 of the draft leaves that out. Under Article 7.2A of the draft, a proposal from the members needs the support of ten Resource Members in Good Standing, and two-thirds of all directors may still refuse it. The draft is being written by a committee whose six members and chair were appointed by the present Board, with the Receiver’s consent, and that Board’s approval is required before the final draft reaches the members. The members must still approve any amendment, and that vote is the last check left.
Lu Heng’s Note 32
On The Agency Problem at the Core of Internet Governance
What happens when those who govern a system neither own it nor bear its risks?
Do governments govern AFRINIC?
By law, no.
AFRINIC is not a government, a regulator or an international organisation. When its management asked the Government of Mauritius, repeatedly, for the status and immunities of an international organisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the request “cannot be entertained”. AFRINIC presents its transfer policy as strengthening its “governance mandate”, and no law gives a private registry that mandate. Yet in the disputed election of September 2025 the candidates of a single alliance of 40 governments won seven of the eight seats on its Board. AFRINIC belongs to its members, who elect its Board: a registry is not a continental government, and its Board should not be filled with the candidates of an alliance of governments.
Lu Heng’s Note 19
Why RIRs Do Not Have Authority — and Why “Community Sovereignty” Breaks the System
What is the difference between authority and cooperation, and which one do registries have?
What has gone wrong with AFRINIC’s governance?
Six things since 2021, each on the record.
AFRINIC’s own audit, published in January 2021, found 2,371,584 IPv4 addresses misappropriated from its pool. That year its Board resolved to end a member’s membership, and those then running AFRINIC “deliberately flouted” the court order that stopped them, as the judgment of 19 July 2022 records. By September 2023 it had too few directors for a quorum. In June 2025 its Receiver annulled a whole election over one proxy. And since 4 February 2026 the addresses AFRINIC has issued cannot leave its region.
- The AFRINIC crisis
- AFRINIC corruption: what AFRINIC’s own audit found
- AFRINIC and contempt of court: the orders it did not obey
Lu Heng’s Note 60
On How Thick Governance Destroyed the Obscurity It Needed to Survive
Why is public attention dangerous to a system that survived in the dark?
Who holds AFRINIC to account?
The courts do, and since 2021 they have.
The Supreme Court of Mauritius has blocked AFRINIC’s resolution against our membership, restrained it from terminating that membership, placed it in receivership on our application and ordered it, on AFRINIC’s own application, to enter us in its register of members. A registry that answers to the courts is safe to deal with. One that asks for immunity from them is not.
Lu Heng’s Note 61
Running-Code Betrayal: How the RIR System Turned Consensus Against the Technical Community
Does “community consensus” give a room the right to rule over networks that are already running?
What should the governance of AFRINIC look like?
A registry that keeps the record and answers to its members and to the law.
Members elect their Board under the constitution as it is written, with the proxy voting it allows. Every eligible Resource Member is on the register and able to vote. Court orders are obeyed, and changed only in court. And a network is free to leave with its addresses. In Lu Heng’s Bill of Rights a registry “may record”, “may coordinate” and “may protect uniqueness”. “It may not rule.” Those are the things we have gone to court for since 2021, and we ask them for every member.
Lu Heng’s Note 72
The Bill of Rights of Uniqueness Coordination
Which rights keep networks running, records accurate, and exit real?