AFRINIC and Smart Africa: who chose the Board?

Smart Africa is an alliance of 40 African governments. AFRINIC is a private company in Mauritius that keeps the record of who holds which IP addresses, and it belongs to its members. In June 2025 Smart Africa published a list of eight candidates for AFRINIC’s Board. The members’ vote that month was annulled, by Smart Africa’s own account after appeals that included its own, and in the rerun seven names on its list took seven of the eight seats. Here is what Smart Africa is, what it has said in its own words, what its plan called CAIGA would do, and why control of a registry gives no government anything it does not already have at home.

What is Smart Africa?

Smart Africa is an alliance of African governments.

Its own releases give it 40 member states and say it acts “under the mandate of its Heads of State and Governments”. AFRINIC is a different kind of body: a private company in Mauritius that keeps the record of who holds which IP addresses, and it belongs to the networks that are its members. One is an alliance of states. The other is a members’ company. This page sets out, in Smart Africa’s own words wherever it has spoken, how Smart Africa’s candidates came to hold seven of the eight elected seats on AFRINIC’s Board.

How did Smart Africa’s list win seven of the eight seats?

In a rerun, after the members’ first vote was thrown away.

In June 2025 AFRINIC’s members voted, and AFRINIC’s Receiver annulled the entire election over, as we said at the time, “one disputed proxy”, “silencing hundreds of valid votes”. Smart Africa’s statement of 23 July 2025 gives its own part in that: the election was “annulled following appeals from multiple stakeholders including Smart Africa”. Those appeals, it says, went to the Government of Mauritius. Its own list of candidates was standing in that election. The Receiver’s rules for the rerun then banned the proxy voting that AFRINIC’s constitution allows: under Article 12.12 a member votes “either by e-voting, by being present in person or by proxy”. The same list stood again, and seven of its eight names won. A commentator who welcomed the result counted the voters on CircleID: “out of a total of 2430 members, slightly over 500 participated”. The Register reported that some in Africa’s internet community were “uncomfortable with Smart Africa’s slate holding a majority of seats on the new board”.

What is CAIGA?

CAIGA is Smart Africa’s plan for a council among governments on internet governance, and AFRINIC is part of the plan.

Smart Africa now spells the name out as the “Council of African Internet Governance Agencies”; it has gone by several others since 2025. ICANN’s chief executive described what it proposes for AFRINIC in a letter of 24 November 2025: “to allow direct governmental involvement in RIR governance”. An RIR is a regional internet registry, which is what AFRINIC is. The Register called it a model that “would give states a role in regulating the internet”. In March 2026 Smart Africa wrote that CAIGA “would not exercise decision-making authority over Internet resources”. In August 2026 Smart Africa met AFRINIC’s Board, and by its own account the two “explored the role of CAIGA”. We have found no published text of CAIGA’s constitution.

What has Smart Africa proposed for AFRINIC?

Its Director General and its consultant have put three things on the table: more say for governments, immunity from lawsuits and, failing that, a new AFRINIC in another country.

In July 2025 the Director General told CIO Mag that governments can demand regional oversight mechanisms, and that Smart Africa could argue for bringing states further into governance structures. In October 2025, at a session Smart Africa held at ICANN’s meeting in Dublin, a consultant presented the reforms drawn up for it. By ICANN’s transcript, he proposed a status that would leave AFRINIC “immune from third-party lawsuits”; if Mauritius would not grant it, moving AFRINIC to another country; and if that failed, “to dissolve AFRINIC in its current legal form” and start again elsewhere. That was three months after Smart Africa wrote that our application to wind AFRINIC up “would jeopardize Africa’s control over its IP address allocation framework”. On voting the consultant said: “people don’t vote by proxy”. The Government of Mauritius has answered such a request before: when AFRINIC’s management asked, repeatedly, for the status and immunities of an international organisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the request “cannot be entertained”.

Who is supposed to choose AFRINIC’s Board?

AFRINIC’s members are.

Its constitution says the directors “shall be elected by Resource and Registered Members”, and the Resource Members are the networks whose addresses AFRINIC records. ICANN’s chief executive wrote in November 2025 that any change to AFRINIC’s governance “must be discussed and decided by the AFRINIC members and the African Internet community”. Alice Munyua, who chaired the UN Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi in 2011, wrote of drafting AFRINIC’s bylaws from outside and coordinating the outcome of its Board election: “That is not policy coordination, it is governance capture.” No treaty created AFRINIC and no parliament elected it. A government body that runs a network can join as a member, like any other network.

Does a seat on AFRINIC’s Board give Africa digital sovereignty?

No.

A registry writes down which network holds which numbers. It runs no network, carries no traffic and stores nobody’s data. Lu Heng’s answer: “A continent is not a sovereign.” Sovereignty belongs to each of Africa’s 54 states inside its own borders, where its own law licenses the operators and its own courts bind them. Eight seats in Mauritius add nothing to that.

Lu Heng’s Note 26

On The Sovereignty Fallacy

Can a continent be sovereign over a coordination record?

What does a government gain from controlling AFRINIC?

Nothing it does not already have at home.

Every African state already governs the networks on its soil: it licenses them, and its courts can call them to account. What a registry holds is one power no state needs and every network fears, the power to strike a network’s addresses from the record. On a continental Board that power sits above 54 national regulators and answers to none of them. Lu Heng calls this sovereignty inversion: “control sits above the nation, while consequence remains below it.” His answer is no attack on states: “This is not about stripping governments of authority.” It is about a registry that only keeps the record, so that there is nothing in Mauritius for anyone to seize.

Lu Heng’s Note 58

From Double Extraction to Sovereignty Inversion: How Nations Lose Sovereign Control to RIRs for US$100

How does a nation’s numbering layer end up under a foreign private body for one hundred dollars?

Is the Board elected in September 2025 valid?

That question is before the Supreme Court of Mauritius.

In SC/COM/MOT/000757/2025, AFRINIC and its Receiver have asked the Court to declare that the September candidates were validly appointed, and we oppose that application. An application for validation is not an order granting it. AFRINIC’s disputes are settled in court: on 7 August 2025, on our application, the Judge in Chambers halted an inspection that, as we said in our constitutional complaint, would call into question judgments the courts had already delivered. We do not recognise this Board as lawfully constituted.

What should AFRINIC’s relationship with governments be?

The one every company has with the state it works in: it obeys the law and the courts.

Governments govern their countries. Networks run their networks. The registry writes down the numbers, and its members elect its Board under the constitution as it is written, with the proxy voting it allows and every eligible Resource Member on the register. In Lu Heng’s Bill of Rights a registry “may record”, “may coordinate” and “may protect uniqueness”. “It may not rule.”