AFRINIC’s proposed constitution: what members would lose
AFRINIC’s bylaws are being rewritten. The draft takes from the members the power to set AFRINIC’s general policies, lets the directors refuse what members propose and lets officers suspend or end a membership, with the addresses returned. The committee writing it was appointed by the Board whose power it increases.
Who is writing it
The draft is being written under the Board it would empower.
The Board that came out of the disputed election of September 2025, which we do not recognise as lawfully constituted, appointed the Bylaws Review Committee’s six members and its chair, with the Receiver’s consent. The committee reports to that Board, and the Board’s approval is required before the final draft reaches the members. Directors are overseeing a proposal that reduces the members’ control over directors.
Lu Heng’s Note 32
On The Agency Problem at the Core of Internet Governance
What happens when those who govern a system neither own it nor bear its risks?
Members lose the power to set policy
Today the members can set AFRINIC’s general policies.
Article 7.6(iv) of the current constitution gives them that power by ordinary resolution, and Article 7.4 of the draft leaves it out. What the members decide now, the Board would decide for them.
Lu Heng’s Note 1
On AFRINIC, RIR Governance, and the Myth of “Community Ownership”
What does “community ownership” mean when a few insiders control the rules?
Directors may refuse members’ proposals
A proposal from the members could be refused by the directors.
Under Article 7.2A of the draft, a proposal needs the support of ten Resource Members in Good Standing, and two-thirds of all directors may still refuse it, with written reasons. The people a proposal is meant to hold to account would decide whether it is heard.
Lu Heng’s Note 73
The Multi-Stakeholder Mirage – How the Multi-Stakeholder Model Turned Attendance Into Mandate
When did attendance start to count as a mandate?
Officers may end a membership
Ending a membership could be left to officers.
Article 8.6 of the draft permits the suspension and termination of members to be delegated to officers, subject to safeguards and appeal, and Article 8.5 keeps the rule that a terminated member returns its addresses. Membership decisions stay tied to control over the addresses a network runs on, the power AFRINIC tried to use against us in 2021.
Lu Heng’s Note 50
On When a Registry Can Destroy Without Cost — and Why the System Then Dies With It
What happens when a registry can destroy a network at a cost of one hundred dollars?
Networks kept at arm’s length
The draft keeps the networks one step away from their own company.
Its Articles 6.5 and 6.6 attach statutory registration and Companies Act rights to directors, while describing Resource Membership as contractual. The Supreme Court ordered us entered in AFRINIC’s register of members under section 91 of the Companies Act, and every eligible Resource Member belongs in that register.
Lu Heng’s Note 19
Why RIRs Do Not Have Authority — and Why “Community Sovereignty” Breaks the System
What is the difference between authority and cooperation, and which one do registries have?
Members still have the last word
The members must still approve any amendment.
That vote is the last check left, and we ask members to use it: reject the provisions that weaken their control while preserving the administrators’ power over their addresses. A constitution for a members’ registry should give members more say, not less.
Lu Heng’s Note 72
The Bill of Rights of Uniqueness Coordination
Which rights keep networks running, records accurate, and exit real?